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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since 1999, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic
transformation of its political system with the coming to
power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in
Venezuela as Chavismo. Chávez has dismantled the previous
political system and established neo-populist structures that
rely on his personal appeal and the close collaboration of the
armed forces. Chávez has relied heavily on significant
support from the poor and those who felt economically and
politically excluded by the “Punto Fijo system.”
President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral
victories; winning every electoral contest except one since
coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively
high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society.
However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high
crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant
corruption in the public administration. Using data from the
AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and
2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez‟s
popular support.
In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that
Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked
to the access to social programs and that as long as the
government is able to fund these social programs or
missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will
possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for
President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that
evaluations of the national economic situation, more than
crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine
support for the regime.

1

EXPLAINING THE RISE TO POWER OF HUGO CHÁVEZ
From the transition to democracy in 1958 up until 1998,
Venezuela had a peculiar democratic regime known as the
“Punto Fijo system,” named for a pact signed by key
political actors during the transition. The system of “pacted”
democracy derived its legitimacy from the capacity of the
state to distribute resources and patronage among power
contenders, particularly industry and organized labor. The
pacts were financed through petroleum wealth that boomed
until the economic crisis of the early 1980s.1 Oil wealth
permitted the state to meet the demands of various groups
without having to make hard choices. The government could
pursue redistributive policies while preserving economic
growth. As a consequence, a “culture of entitlement”
developed. As McCoy et al. explain:
Venezuelan political culture is defined in
large part by the rentier state, which has
maintained social peace and political stability
by distributing externally derived rents from
oil profits, rather than relying on domestic
taxation. In this way, the state has
ameliorated social conflict and gained
legitimacy from the hopes for social mobility
and improved standards of living provided by
1

Terry Lynn Karl, “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to
Democracy in Venezuela,” in Guillermo O‟Donnell, Philippe C.
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, (Baltimore. MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), pp. 196-219; Terry Lynn Karl, “The Venezuelan
Petro-State and the Crisis of „its‟ Democracy,” in Jennifer McCoy,
Andres Serbin, William C. Smith, and Andres Stambouli, Venezuelan
Democracy under Stress, (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center,
University of Miami, 1995), pp. 33-58.

2

oil wealth. The rentier state and the practice
of protection, subsidies, and price controls
from 1960-1980 also produced a culture of
entitlement—a widely-held belief that oil is
the national patrimony, that the country is
rich, and that each individual deserves their
fair share.2
In order to maintain economic expansion the government
had to borrow money in the international market based on
the strength of its ability to generate many times the value of
these obligations with its productive oil industry. By 1981,
however, Venezuela‟s luck began to run out. Oil revenues
declined from 1981 to 1985 from 20 billion to 14 billion U.S.
dollars. In 1986, they went down to 8.7 billion.3 Real wages
that had exhibited a steady increase from 1968 to 1978,
declined precipitously from 1978 to 1990. 4 The year 1989
was particularly disastrous for the Venezuelan economy.
Inflation rose to 84 percent for the year, until then the
highest in the history of the country. Economic output, as
measured by GDP, declined 8.6 percent in real terms, while
salaries shrank by 11 percent.5 In this context, Carlos Andres
Pérez, the newly elected president, implemented a harsh neoliberal restructuring policy that drastically cut state subsidies
2

Jennifer McCoy, Jeff Davies, and Paul Foote, “Reluctant Reformers:
Explaining Privatization in Venezuela and Uruguay,” Paper presented at
the Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Ill,
1998, p. 14.
3
Daniel Hellinger, Venezuela, Tarnished Democracy, (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1991), p. 123.
4
Brain Crisp, Daniel H. Levine and Juan Carlos Rey, “The Legitimacy
Problem,” in Venezuelan Democracy under Distress, Jennifer McCoy, et
al (previous cit., pp. 139-172).
5
Moises Naim, Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela’s
Economic Reforms, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1993), pp. 59-60.
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and social welfare spending. The military was hard hit by the
program in declining real wages and reduced resources for
modernization.
Chavismo itself had its beginnings in the Bolivarian
Revolutionary Movement 200, or MBR 200 (Movimiento
Bolivarian Revolucionario 200), a clandestine organization
within the armed forces founded in 1983 by Hugo Chávez
and fellow junior officers. Using Simón Bolivar‟s ideals,
Chávez and his colleagues rallied the concerns of other
military officers for the coup attempt of 4 February 1992.
The rebellion, and another led by senior officers on 27
November 1992, shook the Venezuelan political
establishment to its core, but the puntofijista system held.
Public opinion surveys taken before and after the coup
attempt indicated that while the public opposed the
traditional parties, only a quarter to a third supported a
military-led government.6 However, during the next six years
the economic and political situation of the country did not
improve and by the elections of December 1998 the public
was prepared to exercise an electoral coup by electing Hugo
Chávez as president. In a hard-fought campaign in which
they promised to end the old political system and call for a
constituent assembly, Chávez and his new party, Movimiento
V República (or MVR) steadily increased in the polls and
won the presidential election with a solid 54 percent of the
vote.

6

Andrew Templeton, “The Evolution of Popular Opinion,” in Louis
Goodman et al, (eds), Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience
(Washington, D.C: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1996); Nelson
Villasmil, La Opinión pública del venezolano actual, (Caracas:
UCAB/Cátedra Fundacional Carlos E. Frías, 2000).
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NEO-POPULISM
AS
THE
PRINCIPLE OF THE REGIME

UNDERLYING

Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies argue that, “In the 1960s
and 1970s professional military officers in Latin America
scanned the panorama of the hemisphere‟s history and
blamed the ineptitude and corruption of civilian politicians
as well as the imported institutions of liberal democracy for
the wretched conditions in their region.” 7 This appears to be
the same motivation in Venezuela. An alienated population
fell under the charm of the charismatic paratrooper who was
willing to sacrifice his life for the country in a heroic effort
to take over the government and “save” the nation from a
corrupt political system.
Chávez has proclaimed himself “an interpreter of the
Venezuelan peoples‟ demands,” one who has been called
upon by historic forces beyond his control to carry out this
mission. Norberto Ceresole, an argentine political thinker,
describes the political system created by Chávez as “postdemocratic.” The system is characterized by the
concentration of power in the hands of a caudillo that
embodies the aspirations of the masses. Ceresole argues that
the new “Venezuelan system” emerges from the fundamental
relationship “caudillo-masses,” one that is rooted in the
history of Latin America. The system is the product of a
revolutionary model that pivots around the basic relationship
between a national caudillo and a mass of people
representing an absolute majority that chooses him,
personally, as their representative. For Ceresole, the
relationship between the masses and the caudillo is not one
7

Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies (eds), The Politics of
Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (revised and updated),
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), p 3.
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of ideas or institutions, but rather a “physical” one embodied
by the fusion of the man with his people (i.e., the man
becomes the people and the people become the man).8
Elections bestow an absolute mandate on the leader to
implement policy as he sees fit. There cannot be any
institutional impediments to his actions because that would
undermine the people‟s will. This description sounds similar
to the notions embodied in Latin America‟s traditional
populism, however, for Ceresole, Chávez represents a
“welcome departure from the global acceptance of liberal
democracy,” which Ceresole sees as an imposition from the
West and not in tune with the traditional cultural and
political structures of Latin America.
Thus the Chávez “revolution” has systematically removed all
the checks and balances required for liberal democracy.
Dismantling liberal democracy was achieved in a two stage
process: (1) elimination of the old political actors in a
position to check the president; and (2) securing the loyalty
or subordination of the new actors. The means for the first
stage was the National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea
Nacional Constituyente--ANC), which was authorized by a
referendum in April 1999 and elected in July 1999, finished
with its draft in three months, had the new constitution
ratified on 15 December 1999, and disbanded itself on 31
January 2000. The greatest advantage to the ANC was its
ability to eliminate checks on the president in the short term.
Only a constituent assembly would have the power to
neutralize the opposition-controlled Congress elected in
November 1998. The old Congress allowed itself to be
marginalized soon after the ANC was seated, and it formally
8

Norberto Ceresole, “El modelo venezolano o la posdemocracia:
Caudillo, apóstoles, pueblo.” El Universal Digital,
(http://politica.eud.com/1999/03/08/ceresole.html), 11 January 1999.
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ceased to exist the day the 1999 constitution was ratified.
That date also marked the elimination of the Supreme Court
(Corte Suprema de Justicia) and the beginning of the second
stage, as the ANC appointed a new Supreme Justice Tribunal
(Tribunal Supremo de Justicia), a new electoral council, and
a new Comptroller General, all of whom were allies of
Chávez. At the same time, the ANC designated an un-elected
National Legislative Committee to take the place of the
legislature until new elections could be held, and appointed a
commission that purged hundreds of judges from the courts.
This transitional regime continued in power until August
2000, when new officials elected in July were seated. Chávez
himself was reelected with a 56.9 percent landslide, and his
allied parties won at least 99 of 165 seats in the new
unicameral National Assembly. In November 2000 they
granted the president sweeping powers to issue decree-laws
in areas ranging from economic development to land reform.
A few governors remained affiliated with opposition parties,
but the federal government undermined their power by
reducing funding for state and local governments. Between
December 1998 and August 2000, therefore, Chávez
removed, co-opted, or severely weakened all possible checks
from other branches and levels of government.
CHALLENGING CHAVISMO
A deepening economic recession, coupled with Chávez‟s
personalistic rule and incendiary rhetoric, caused many
Venezuelans and even some of his political allies to lose
faith in the movement. By the end of 2001, the internal
political situation in Venezuela was at a critical moment.9
9

The discussion of the political situation before and after the April 2002
coup draws heavily from Orlando J. Pérez, “Chavismo and the
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Political opposition to the president had been mounting since
December 10, 2001, when civic groups, unions, and business
organizations staged the first nationwide strike to express
discontent with the government‟s decision to decree the
adoption of a large package of economic reform measures.
In a move widely seen as a sign of growing discontent within
the armed forces, during the month of February 2002 a series
of high-ranking officers publicly criticized the government.
On February 7, Air Force Colonel Pedro Soto called the
regime “fascist” and “totalitarian.” While Colonel Soto
claimed to represent “75 percent of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and troops,” there were no signs of a
deeper move against the President. However, the next day
Captain Pedro Flores called the president “undemocratic.”
On February 18, Vice-Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo
accused Chávez of harming the national interest. And on
February 25 Brigadier General Roman Gomez said “There is
a crisis in every sector of power...they [the government]
want to split us into two groups...this division has been
carried into the armed forces as well.” The General went on
to say, “Our loyalty is to the nation, not with the current
administration.”10
President Chávez‟s decision to dismiss several board
members at the state-owned petroleum company, Petróleos
de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), on April 7 and the subsequent
work stoppage at key oil production facilities, due to a
renewed nationwide strike on April 10 forced PDVSA to
declare that it would not be able to comply with contractual
Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Venezuela,” South Eastern
Latinamericanist, (Summer 2002): pp. 12-33.
10
“Chávez unmoved as officers desert,” BBC
News,(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/), February 26,
2002.
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crude oil and product supply commitments with its
international clients. The increased prospects that the oneday nationwide work stoppage could turn into an indefinite
strike, and an escalation of violence that resulted in 15 deaths
and 315 injured on April 11, prompted a military coup and
the arrest of President Chávez. The military installed an
interim government led by Pedro Carmona Estanga, a
business leader. A combination of overreaching by the new
government, popular protests in favor of the return of
Chavez, and divisions within the military led to a collapse of
the interim government and Chavez returned to power on
April 13, 2002.
Chávez reacted forcefully to this turn of events, announcing
new measures to reinvigorate the “revolution,” calling for the
creation of local, neighborhood groups known as Círculos
Bolivarianos (Bolivarian Circles). These efforts proved
highly successful, as over two million Venezuelans
organized Círculos and other pro-Chávez organizations in
their communities. The Círculos provided a basis for popular
opposition to the attempted coup of 2002, and eventually for
an electoral campaign.
Rising oil prices provided Chávez an opportunity to establish
a series of social programs that became the basis for a radical
new direction in government social policy, and significantly
improved the president‟s public approval ratings. The new
programs, called Misiones (Missions), drew on billions of
dollars in oil revenues to provide free health care, remedial
education, basic foodstuffs, plus occupational training and
development loans to micro-industrial and rural
cooperatives.
While feelings of frustration lingered and allowed the
opposition to successfully call a presidential recall election
9

in 2004, by the time the election occurred in August of that
year Chávez had regained his popular support and won with
58 percent of the vote. In subsequent local elections in
October 2004, Chavista candidates captured nearly every
seat. And in the 2005 national legislative elections, a
decision by the opposition to abstain resulted in a complete
victory for Chávez. As a result, the legislature no longer had
any opposition members. The regime then pushed a radical
agenda set of reforms labeled “Socialism of the Twenty-First
Century.”11
These
reforms
included
additional
nationalization of vital industries, deepening the role and
extent of the Missions, creation of Community Councils,
increasing the role of local radio and TV, and the creation of
the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista
Único de Venezuela, PSUV).
In large part because of the economic rebound and attention
to social programs, Chávez was reelected to another six-year
term in December 2006 with almost 63 percent of the vote.
After his reelection the regime radicalized further, as
evidenced by the May 2007 closure of a popular Venezuelan
television station that was critical of the government, Radio
Caracas Television (RCTV). The closure of RCTV sparked
11

Twenty-first century socialism is the brainchild of Heinz Dietrich
Steffan, a German professor, in his book "El Socialismo del Siglo XXI"
published in 2000. Dietrich proposes a new kind of socialism with four
basic institutions: The first institution is the equivalence economy. Under
this system, value is determined by those who create it, instead of the
market. Value replaces price. The second institution is participative
democracy, which uses the plebiscite to decide important questions that
concern its citizens. The third institution is basic organizations, that is,
the political or social organizations closest to the community that they
serve. The fourth institution is development or structuralism, an
economic theory that holds that the core industrial center with an
agricultural periphery produces underdevelopment and increases the gap
between developed and underdeveloped nations.
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significant protests and worldwide condemnation. Chávez
also proposed a far-reaching constitutional amendment
package that would have consolidated and deepened the
social reforms, as well as provide for unlimited reelection for
the president. The amendments were defeated by a close
margin in a December 2007 national referendum. The cloture
of RCTV and the constitutional referendum saw the
emergence of University students as the vanguard of
opposition to the regime. This coincided with a
fragmentation of the political opposition.
State and local elections held in November 2008 revealed a
mixed picture of support for the government and the
opposition. Pro-Chávez candidates won 17 of the 22
governors‟ races, while the opposition won governorships in
three of the country‟s most populous states, Zulia, Miranda
and Carabobo, as well as the states of Nueva Esparta and
Táchira. At the municipal level, pro-Chávez candidates won
over 80 percent of the more than 300 mayoral races, while
the opposition won the balance. Among the opposition‟s
mayoral successes were races for the metropolitan mayor of
Caracas, four out of the five smaller municipalities that make
up Caracas (including the poor municipality of Sucre), and
the country‟s second-largest city, Maracaibo.12
In the aftermath of the state and municipal elections,
President Chávez announced that he would move ahead with
another referendum to change the constitution to lift the twoterm limit on the presidential office. The referendum was
scheduled for February 15, 2009, and various polls indicated
12

Tyler Bridges, “Chávez Allies Score Big Wins in Venezuela Elections,”
Miami Herald, November 24, 2008; Simon Romero, “Venezuelan
Opposition Gains in Several Crucial Elections,” New York Times,
November 24, 2008.
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that the vote would be close. Ultimately, with a participation
rate of 70 percent Venezuelans approved the constitutional
reform with almost 55 percent voting for it and 45 percent
voting against it.13 President Chávez claimed the vote was a
victory for the Bolivarian Revolution, and promised he
would seek reelection in 2012.14 The president‟s support
among many poor Venezuelans, who have benefited from
increased social spending and programs, was an important
factor in the vote.
Elections for the 165-member National Assembly were held
on September 26, 2010, and pro Chávez supporters won 98
seats while opposition parties obtained 67. 15 Nationwide
participation in the elections was high, with 66.45 percent
participation, but lower than the 75 percent participation in
the 2006 presidential race.
The results of the legislative elections could be an indication
that President Chávez will face a tough reelection bid in
2012. The results were significant for the opposition not only
because they denied President Chávez a two-thirds majority,
but because the opposition will now have a voice in the
National Assembly. Nevertheless, while the opposition now
has a voice in the legislature, it is unclear how united the
multi-party opposition will be, or how effective it will be in
presenting itself as a viable political alternative that is
appealing to the Venezuelan electorate. While support for
President Chávez diminished in 2009 and 2010 for a variety
of reasons—such as high crime, inflation, shortages of some
13

Results are available at:
http://www.cne.gov.ve/divulgacion_referendo_enmienda_2009/.
14
Juan Forero, “Chávez Wins Removal of Term Limits,” Washington
Post, February 16, 2009.
15
“Venezuela Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
November 2010.
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food items and other consumer products, and repression of
political opponents—his popularity reportedly has risen to
about 50 percent in February 2011, more than any other
political figure in the country. 16
DETERMINANTS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
So, what are the factors that explain support for President
Hugo Chávez? This section uses data from the
AmericasBarometer surveys to examine the evolution of and
factors that explain presidential approval rates for Hugo
Chávez.
The AmericasBarometer is an integral part of the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt
University.17 The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP
to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas
using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The
AmericasBarometer has been conducted every two years
since 2004. In 2004, the first round of surveys was
implemented with eleven participating countries; the second
took place in 2006-07 and incorporated 22 countries
throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout
the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of
countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets
are
available
on
the
LAPOP
website:

16

“Revolution by Numbers,” Latin American Andean Group Report,
Latin American Newsletters, February 2011, RA-11-02.
17
The author has been involved with the project since its inception in the
early 1990s, and is a member of the project‟s Scientific Support Group,
as well as country-team leader for Panama. The author wishes to thank
Mitchell A. Seligson, director and founder of LAPOP, for generously
permitting use of the Venezuela data.
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www.LapopSurveys.org. The Venezuelan surveys were
conducted in 2007,18 200819 and 2010.20

18

The 2007 survey was conducted by Centro de Investigaciones en
Ciencias Sociales (CISOR), with scientific direction being provided by
Mitchell A. Seligson. The field work was carried out by Borge and
Associates. For the purposes of this survey, the population of interest
consisted of all Venezuelan citizens, 18 years or older residing in the
country. The sample was self-weighted and was designed to be
representative of the voting population in terms of gender, age and
geographic distribution. The survey was a national probability design,
with a total N of 1,510 and the country was stratified into six (6) regions:
capital, zuliana, west, mid-west, east and Los Llanos. The complete
sample of 1,510 is composed of 50.1% male respondents and 49.9%
female, and its estimated margin of error is ± 2.5 (at the 95% level). The
complete questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.
19
The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Centro
de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales (CISOR) with field work being
carried out by CEDATOS. Funding came from Interamerican
Development Bank (IDB). The project used a national probability sample
design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people involving
face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a
complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering.
The sample was stratified by regions (capital, zuliana, west, mid-west,
east and Los Llanos) and by urban and rural areas. The total number of
respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1221 and 279 in rural areas. The
estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.
20
The 2010 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with the
field work being carried out by CEDATOS. The 2010
AmericasBarometer received generous support from many sources,
including UNDP, IADB, Vanderbilt U., Princeton U., Université Laval,
U. of Notre Dame, among others. The project used a national probability
sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people. It
involved face-to-face interviews conducted in Spanish. The survey used a
complex sample design, taking into account stratification and clustering.
The sample consists of six strata representing the six main geographical
regions: Metropolitan area (capital), zuliana, west, mid-west, east and
Los Llanos. Each stratum was further sub-stratified by urban and rural
areas. A total of 1,440 respondents were surveyed in urban areas and 60
in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.
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In order to measure approval of Chávez, the survey asks
respondents “Speaking in general, how well is President
Hugo Chávez performing his job.” The wording of the
question is: “M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno,
diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente
Hugo Chávez es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2)
Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy
malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR” (In general terms, would you say
that the work done by President Chávez is: [read options] (1)
very good (2) good (3) neither good, nor bad—regular (4)
bad (5) very bad (terrible) (8) don‟t know/no answer.)
Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses for 2010. The
data reveals that a plurality of Venezuelans in 2010, 43
percent, indicated that President Chávez‟s performance was
“regular” or “neither good, nor bad.” The rest of respondents
are divided almost evenly between positive and negative
evaluations, 28.1 percent say the performance is good or
very good, and 28.9 percent that it is bad or very bad.
Figure 1: Presidential Approval, 2010
Very Bad
12.8%

Very Good
8.9%

Good
19.2%

Bad
16.1%

Regular
43.0%

Speaking in general,
how well is President Hugo Chávez performing his job?
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
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Figure 221 presents results for presidential approval rates
over the three rounds of the AmericasBarometer in
Venezuela. The results show steady erosion in satisfaction
with the performance of President Chávez, from an average
approval of 57.1, on the 0-100 scale in 2007, to 48.8 in 2010.
Since the mid-point of the scale is 50, any average below
that number can be interpreted to represent marginally
negative levels of support.22
Figure 2: Presidential Approval over Time
60

57.1
53.1
48.8

50

40

30

20

10

0
2007

2008
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Year of Survey
95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
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For purposes of statistical analysis and improved presentation of
results the responses are recoded into a scale 0-100, with 0=very bad and
100=very good.
22
The grey area at the top of the bars represents the confidence interval
around the mean. The wider this area the greater the dispersion of
responses around the mean and thus the less reliable the mean is. When
the areas overlap the differences between the bars are not statistically
significant.
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Erosion in support may be the result of deteriorating security
and economic conditions. Studies have shown that Chávez‟s
base of support is among the lower socio‐economic groups
who might be expected to be most affected by rising crime
and deteriorating economic conditions, particularly a decline
of purchasing power due to inflation.23 Venezuela suffers
from one of the highest homicide rates in Latin America. The
Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV), whose data is
widely followed in the absence of official statistics, said the
South American nation has one of the highest crime rates on
the continent, with 54 homicides per 100,000 citizens in
2009. That rate is only surpassed in Latin America by El
Salvador where 70 in every 100,000 citizens were murdered
in 2009. Homicides have quadrupled since President Hugo
Chávez came to power, with two people murdered every
hour. Caracas has now the world's highest murder rate.
According to official figures reported by a survey on
victimization carried out by the National Statistics Institute
(INE), the Venezuelan capital has become the deadliest city
in the world. A total of 7,676 people were killed in the
Metropolitan Area of Caracas in 2009. According to this
survey, the murder rate in the Venezuelan capital was 233
per 100,000 inhabitants.24

23

Damarys Canache, “Urban Poor and Political Order.” in Jennifer L.
McCoy and David Myers (eds), The Unraveling of Representative
Democracy in Venezuela, (Baltimore, MD: John‟s Hopkins University
Press, 2004), p. 33‐49; Barry Cannon, “Class/Race Polarisation in
Venezuela and the Electoral Success of Hugo Chávez: A Break with the
Past of the Song Remains the Same?” Third World Quarterly 29(4) 2008:
731‐748; Oliver Heath “Explaining the Rise of Class Politics in
Venezuela.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 28(2) 2009: 185‐203;
Noam Lupu, “Who Votes for Chavismo? Class Voting in Hugo Chavez‟s
Venezuela.” Latin American Research Review 45(1) 2010: 7‐32.
24
Data on homicide rates are notoriously difficult to ascertain. Other
surveys point to a rate in Caracas of 140 per 100,000 inhabitants.
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Figure 3 compares homicide rates of selected Latin
American countries and shows the increase in violence in
Venezuela relative to other nations. Particularly relevant is
the decline in homicides in Colombia versus the increase in
Venezuela.
Figure 3: Homicide Rates per 100,000 inhabitants,
selected Latin American Countries

Another factor that may influence the decline in presidential
approval is the deterioration of the economy. As a major oil
producer, Venezuela benefitted from the rise in world oil
prices that began in 2004. Fueled by the windfall from oil
price increases, the Venezuelan economy grew by over 18
percent in 2004, about 10 percent in 2005 and 2006, 8.2
percent in 2007, and 4.8 percent in 2008. The country‟s GDP
growth began to slow in the second quarter of 2008 and
turned negative in the first quarter of 2009. High levels of

Regardless of the actual number, the reality is that Caracas is among the
most violent cities in the world.
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inflation, averaging 30 percent in 2008, 27 percent in 2009,
and 28 percent in 2010, have also eroded purchasing power.
Figure 4: GDP Growth (%) in Venezuela, 2001-201025

The AmericasBarometer survey allows us to examine which
factors explain approval of the job performed by President
Chávez. In order to do so, we employ a multivariate
regression analysis which examines the impact of a series of
independent variables on our dependent variable, in this case
presidential approval. As independent variables I use some
of the standard demographic variables: age, gender, wealth,
education, and area of residence. In addition, I employ
25

U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(UNCLA), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean,
(Santiago, Chile, 2010).
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measures of crime victimization, perception of insecurity,
evaluation of the national and personal economic condition,
along with a measure of levels of utilization of the
government‟s mission programs. Appendix one lays out how
each variable is operationalized. Figure 5 displays
graphically the results of the regression analysis. 26
Figure 5: Determinants of Satisfaction with the Job
Performed by President Chávez

Size of Place of Residence
Perception of Insecurity
Perception of Personal Economic Situation
Perception of National Economic Situation
Participation in Mission Programs
Crime Victimization
Percep. Family Econ. Sit.
Education

R-Squared =0.369
F=48.966
N =1386

Age
Female
Quintiles of wealth
-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The results indicate three factors as the most important in
explaining approval of the job performed by the president:
perception of the national economic situation, participation
in government mission programs, and levels of wealth.
26

Statistical significance is graphically represented by a confidence
interval that does not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). When
the dot, which represents the predicted impact of that variable, falls to the
right of the vertical “0” line it implies a positive relationship whereas if it
falls to the left it indicates a negative contribution. Appendix 2 shows the
regression coefficients.
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Despite high levels of violence, crime victimization and
perception of insecurity are not statistically significant
factors.
Individuals who believe the national economy is doing well,
have participated most in government missions, and are
poorer are more inclined to express greater support for the
president. Figure 6 shows the bivariate relationship between
the three factors and satisfaction with the job of the
president. As illustrated in the graphs, levels of presidential
approval increase significantly for those individuals who
have participated in the mission programs. The increase in
presidential approval is close to 20 points. Respondents who
evaluate the national economic conditions as “very good”
approve of the president‟s job by nearly 50 points higher
than individuals who believe the economy is doing very
poorly. Finally, the poorest Venezuelans approve of the
president‟s performance by nearly 15 points higher than the
wealthiest citizens.
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Figure 6: Factors that Determine Satisfaction with the
President’s Job Performance
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The results suggest that the government‟s signature
programs, the social missions (Misiones Sociales) are a key
element in preserving support for the regime. Financed
primarily through oil revenues there have been some 25
missions offering a wide array of services in the fields of
education, health, nutrition, the environment, sports, culture,
and housing, as well as targeted programs for indigenous
rights and services for street children, adolescents, and
mothers at risk. The AmericasBarometer 2010 survey asked
specifically about four of the most important missions:
MERCAL, Barrio Adentro, Ribas and Madres del Barrio.
MERCAL provides subsidized food through state owned
supermarkets, and additional services to children, the elderly
and those living in poverty. Evidence from the survey,
however, suggests that MERCAL is utilized by many
Venezuelans, including those in the middle classes. Barrio
Adentro is a mission aimed at providing access to health care
and initially relied heavily on Cuban doctors. Ribas provides
high school degrees to adults and at risk youths. Finally,
22

Madres del Barrio provides family planning advice,
vocational training and loans to mothers from the poorest
communities.
Figure 7: Participation in Social Missions,
2010
No
36.8%

Yes
46.7%

No
53.3%

Yes
63.2%

Use of MERCAL
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Use of Barrio Adentro
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Yes
2.5%

Yes
10.9%

No
89.1%

No
97.5%

Use of RIBAS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Use of Madres del Barrio
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure 7 indicates the percent of citizens who said they had
participated in the specific missions in the last 12 months.
We observe that participation is most extensive in
MERCAL, the subsidized supermarkets, with over 60
percent of Venezuelans saying they have used these services.
Such large participation would indicate that even middle
class Venezuelans have sought the help of these
supermarkets to subsidize their purchase of food items.
Given the high levels of inflation and the recent shortages of
basic food items, it should not be a surprise that a substantial
number of Venezuelans seek help by using MERCAL. The
next highest level of participation is in the health delivery
mission Barrio Adentro. Over 46 percent of Venezuelans say
they have used these services in the last 12 months. Much
23

lower participation is found for mission Ribas and Madres
del Barrio, only 11 and 2.5 percent respectively.
Figure 8: Overall Participation in Social Missions

No
30.8%

Yes
69.2%

Participation in Mission Programs
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Overall, Figure 8 indicates that 69.2 percent of Venezuelans
surveyed in 2010 said they participated in at least one social
mission in the past 12 months. These results suggest that as
long as the government is able to fund the social missions,
particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an
important tool to garner and sustain support for President
Chávez.
Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the
national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity,
are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.
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Figure 9: Evaluation of the National Economic Situation,
201027
Very Good
2.8%
Very Bad
13.2%

Good
16.1%

Bad
25.5%
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42.3%

How would you rate the current national economic situation?
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure 9 shows that a plurality of Venezuelans in 2010
evaluated the economic situation as “neither good, nor bad”
or “regular,” with 42.3 percent choosing this option. A
nearly equal percentage of citizens, 39 percent, evaluate the
economy as bad or very bad. Only 18.9 percent express
positive evaluations of the national economic situation.
The evidence suggests that evaluations of the national
economic situation have eroded since 2007, corresponding to
a decline in the percentage of GDP growth and rising
27

The question used is: SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía…
¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es
muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena
(2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala
(pésima)[ translated as: Now, talking about the economy..How would
you describe the national economy? Would you say it is very good,
good, neither good nor bad or very bad?]
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inflation. Figure 10 indicates a steady decline in the
evaluations of the national economic situation.
Figure 10: Perception of National Economic Situation
over Time28
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The results reflect a generally neutral evaluation of the
national economic situation. Unfortunately, we do not have
survey data for years prior to 2007, a year which saw
significant economic growth but well below the highs of
2004. By 2008 the economy had begun a rapid contraction
which saw declines in GDP growth of -3.3 in 2009 and -1.8
in 2010. These years, as seen earlier, saw a significant rise in
inflation reaching close to 30 percent in 2008-2010.

28

These results are obtained by recoding the SOCT1 question into a 0100 scale, where 0=very negative evaluations and 100=very positive
evaluations.
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Figure 11: Magnitude of Economic Crisis, 2010
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The AmericasBarometer 2010 survey asked respondents to
evaluate the extent of the economic crisis confronting the
country. Figure 11 demonstrates that only 7.1 percent of
Venezuelans say the country is not suffering an economic
crisis. An overwhelming 92.9 percent of citizens interviewed
indicated the country was suffering an economic crisis, 44.5
percent of those said the crisis was not grave. Additionally,
when citizens are asked who they blame for the economic
crisis most choose the current government.
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Figure 12: Who is to blame for the current
economic crisis?
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Who is to blame for the current economic crisis?
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

We observe in Figure 12 that 44.1 percent of Venezuelans
blame the Chávez government for the economic crisis. Only
5.1 percent blame the “wealthy countries” and 3.1 percent
the “rich” people of Venezuela.
Finally, Figure 13 demonstrates the clear connection
between evaluations of the economy and presidential
approval. Individuals who believe the country is not
suffering an economic crisis express significantly higher
support for President Chávez than those who believe the
economy is suffering a grave economic crisis. The difference
is more than 40 points.

28

Figure 13: Perceptions of Economic Crisis
and Presidential Approval
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CONCLUSION
Since coming to power in 1999 Hugo Chávez has
transformed the political landscape of Venezuela. He
dismantled the institutional structures of liberal democracy
and implemented a system that he calls participatory, but that
relies heavily on Chávez‟s personal authority. The system
depends on support from a large mass of poor Venezuelans
disaffected from the previous political system and clamoring
for political, social and economic empowerment. The regime
has used oil revenues to build a system of social programs
aimed at providing basic services to the poorest sectors of
Venezuelan society. Chávez has been able to combine
incendiary rhetoric against the United States and European
powers, as well as wealthy Venezuelans, along with
substantial government subsidies to garner and maintain
sufficient popular support to win all but one electoral contest
29

since 1999, including winning election as president twice
under the current Constitution.
This study has shown that presidential approval is influenced
significantly by evaluations of the national economic
situation and participation in social missions. These two may
in fact be counteracting each other. That is, as the economic
situation deteriorates, particularly the rising rate of inflation,
support for the regime will likely decline. The evidence
suggests that Venezuelans who believe the country is
suffering an economic crisis support the president 40 points
less than those who believe there is no economic crisis.
Under these circumstances, the regime will be forced to
increase subsidies through the social missions in order to
bolster support. The evidence presented here suggests that
the use of some social missions by Venezuelan citizens is
widely generalized, including many in the middle class. The
results of our study suggests that the Venezuelan
government‟s social missions have been quite successful at
building a bulwark of support that has so far allowed it to
weather the economic downturn and rising levels of
violence. Whether such efforts can continue, or be
strengthened, remains an open question, and will depend on
economic factors beyond the control of the Venezuelan
government, such as oil prices.
The regime will no doubt attempt to build on the social
missions as it seeks to increase support in order to guarantee
Chávez another term in office in the elections of 2012. While
Chávez‟s re-election will depend greatly on the unity and
strength of the political opposition, continued economic
problems and increasing violence also will be critical issues
determining the future of the populist leader.
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An additional wrinkle was added in early June 2011 when,
after weeks of speculation, President Chávez announced
from Cuba that he was battling cancer. Chávez spent nearly a
month in Cuba before returning to Venezuela on July 4. He
departed for Havana once again on July 16 after petitioning
Venezuela's national congress for a medical leave that
allowed him to remain at the head of the government.
Regime supporters insist that Chávez will recover and
successfully contest the 2012 presidential elections. For the
opposition, the president‟s illness poses opportunities and
challenges. On the one hand, if the president decides not to
run or dies before the elections regime supporters may
struggle to find a replacement that could galvanize the
masses that have supported Chávez since the late 1990s. On
the other hand, the removal of Chávez may splinter the
opposition by eliminating the one clear factor that has united
them for the past years. No reliable polling has been done
since Chávez‟s illness to measure what effect it may have on
his popularity or prospects in 2012. One might speculate that
the regime will attempt to use the president‟s struggle with
cancer to rally popular sentiment in his favor. If for whatever
reason Chávez is not the official candidate in 2012, regime
supporters, assuming they can unite behind a single
successor, would likely use similar tactics to rally support to
“continue the revolution.” While much remains uncertain
about the future of the Venezuelan regime, what is clear is
that the problems of rising crime and continued economic
deterioration, particularly increasing inflation, along with the
health of the president, represent serious and transcendental
challenges to the survival of Hugo Chávez and his neopopulist experiment.
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APPENDIX 1
Measurement of Variables
Presidential job
approval

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno,
¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el
Presidente [NOMBRE PRESIDENTE ACTUAL]
es...?:

Size of Place of
Residence

TAMANO.
(1)
Capital
nacional
(área
metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad
mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural

Perception of
personal economic
situation

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación
económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena,
buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala
(regular) (4) Mala
(5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

Perception of
national economic
situation

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía…
¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país?
¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni
mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena
(3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy
mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

Participation in
Mission Programs

Scale composed of the following questions:
MIS16. Pensando en los últimos doce meses
dígame si ha usado las siguientes misiones
sociales:
Sí
No
MERCAL
1
0
Barrio Adentro 1
0
Ribas
1
0
Madres
del 1
0
Barrio

35

Education

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que
usted completó o aprobó?

Gender

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre
(2) Mujer

Age

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?

Crime victim

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted
víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los
últimos 12 meses?

Perception of
Insecurity

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia
donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de
ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted
muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy
inseguro?

Wealth

Measured as a scale of possession of capital goods
but based on relative wealth. For more information
on this indicator, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009
“Methodological Note: Measuring Relative
Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In
AmericasBarometer Insights Series.
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php).

Perception of
Family Economic
Situation

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el
total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas]
(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar
(2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades
(3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades
(4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades
(88) [No leer] NS
(98) [No leer] NR
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APPENDIX 2
Determinants of Satisfaction with bPerformance
of Current President
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Performance Current
President
Coefficient.
t
Quintiles of wealth

-0.133*

(-5.37)

Female

-0.034

(-1.46)

Age

-0.004

(-0.15)

Education

-0.026

(-1.03)

Perception of Family
Economic Situation
Crime Victimization

0.087*

(2.44)

-0.025

(-0.90)

Participation in Mission
Programs
Perception of National
Economic Situation
Perception of Personal
Economic Situation
Perception of Insecurity

0.211*

(7.20)

0.430*

(14.80)

0.066*

(2.04)

-0.045

(-1.65)

Size of area of
residende
Constant

-0.019

(-0.51)

-0.004

(-0.12)

R-Squared

0.369

Number of Obs.

1386

* p<0.05
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